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Recent Cases
APPLICATION OF THE RULE Res Ipsa Loquitur TO ACTIONS BY EMPLOYEE
AGAINST His EMPLOYER
Wkjtmaker v. Pitcairn'
Plaintiff was head brakeman in the employment of defendant. While riding
on the locomotive of a freight train a derailment resulted in injuries to him. The
cause of the accident was a very heavy rainfall earlier in the night which had washed
out the ballast under the ties and a rail of the track. Plaintiff pleaded negligence
generally under the res ipsa loquitur doctrine. The court upheld a judgment for
plaintiff on the grounds that the rule res ipsa loquitur applies to personal injuries
actions by an employee against his employer under the Federal Employers' Lia-
bility Act, and the fact that the injured employee was operating or working with
the instrument causing the injury does not of itself forbid the application of the
doctrine.
The recognition of the application of the rule res ipsa loquitur to cases between
an employee and employer is the result of a complete revolution in judicial and
legislative thinking which has taken several centuries to occur. Under strict com-
mon law principles with defenses of assumption of risk, negligence of fellow ser-
vants, and contributory negligence available to the employer, it was almost im-
possible for an employee to maintain successfully against his employer a suit for
injuries sustained in the course of his employment. With the development of mass
industry and the subordination of the individual worker to the machinery of pro.
duction, these rules no longer served the best interest of society and so were modified
by statutes of the federal government as applied to workers in interstate com-
merce. In 1893 and 1908 the Federal Employers' Liability Act and the Federal Safe.
ty Appliances Act, respectively, were passed which practically did away witl the
common law defenses in actions brought under them.2
Prior to these enactments the federal courts did not allow the application of the
rule res ips.a loquitur to employee cases. 3 The courts were often slow to recognize
the scope of the changes made by the new acts and continued to apply the strictest
rules of evidence and law in actions brought by employees. 4 Some of the cases are
1. 174 S. W. (2d) 163 (Mo. 1943).
2. Ridge v. Norfolk Southern Ry., 167 N. C. 510, 83 S. E. 762 (1914); 35
AM. JUR., MASTER AND SERvANT § 391; L. R. A. 1917E, 215, 226.
3. (1923) 36 HARv. L. REV. 759.
4. Patton v. Texas & P. R. R., 179 U. S. 638, 21 Sup. Ct. 275; Cincinnati,
N. 0. & T. P. Ry. v. South Fork Coal Co., 139 F. 528, 536 (C. C. A. 6th, 1905);
Midland Valley R. R. v. Fulgham Adm'r, 181 Fed. 91 (C. C. A. 8th, 1910); Lucid v.
E. I. DuPont de Nemours Powder Co., 199 Fed. 377 (C.. C. A. 9th, 1912); Ameri-
can Car & Foundry Co. v. Schachlewick, 229 Fed. 559 (C. C. A. 8th, 1916); L. R.
(283)
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based on a misconception of the doctrine. A few courts maintained strongly that
the burden of proof was on the plaintiff worker and therefore he could not have the
advantage of the rule.5 Others developed a double standard for the application of
the rule res ipsa, loquitur, allowing it in cases between passengers and carriers and
denying it in cases between employees and employers." Many of the decisions which
are cited as denying the application of the rule to any suit by an employee against
employer are cases in which the facts did not warrant the application of the rule.7
Gradually the courts began to examine the precedents, such as the Patton
and Looney cases and to realize the changes which the Federal Employers' Liability
Act had made.8 The United States Supreme Court in 1914 and 1917 approved cases
in which the rule was applied in an action brought by an employee against his
employer.9 The court held that the former decisions of the court were not con-
trolling in cases involving the Federal Employers' Liability Act and, if the facts
warranted, that the rule res ipsa loquitur could be applied. But these two deci-
sions of the Supreme Court seem to have been overlooked for the most part andc
it was not until 1923 that two decisions in the federal courts were handed down
which provide the precedents for the more modem decisions.10 The Cochran case
pointed out that, under the Employers' Liability law, employees were really in a
more favorable position to bring their actions against employers than passengers
were in bringing theirs against carriers because contributory negligence would not
be a bar to the employee. The court in the Peluso. case made a rather complete
analysis of the res ipsa loquitur rule and pointed out the mistakes of some former
cases in refusing to apply it to employer-employee cases. The reasoning and hold-
ings of these decisions have been approved and applied in a number of cases."'
A. 1917E, 1, 4; Id. at 182, 187; 35 AM. JUR., MASTER AND SERVANT § 391. Contra:
Guffin v. Manise, 166 N. Y. 188, 59 N. E. 925 (1901).
5. Patton v. Texas & P. R. R., 179 U. S. 658, 663, 21 Sup. Ct. 275, 277 (1901);
Looney v. Metropolitan R. R., 200 U. S. 480, 26 Sup. Ct. 303, 306 (1906); New
Orleans & N. E. R. R. v. Harris, 247 U. S. 367, 371, 38 Sup. Ct. 535, 536 (1918).
6. Byers v. Carnegie Steel Co., 159 Fed. 347, 350 (C. C. A. 6th, 1908);
Southern R. R. v. Deir, 240 Fed. 73, 76 (C. C. A. 6th, 1917); exhaustive note in
L. R. A. 1917E 4.
7. (1907) 20 HARv. L. REV. 228, 229; L. R. A. 1917E, 1, 4; Id. at 68.
8. Cochran v. Pittsburg & Lake Erie R. R., 31 F. (2d) 769 (App. D. C.
1923); Neary v. Georgia Pub. Serv. Co., 27 Ga. App. 238, 107 S. E. 893 (1921);
Decahn v. Edy, 186 Ind. 205, 115 N. E. 577 (1907).
9. Minneapolis & St. Louis R. R. v. Golshall, 244 U. S. 66, 37 Sup. Ct. 598
(1917); Southern Ry.-Carolina Division v. Bennett, 233 U. S. 80, 34 Sup. Ct. 566
(1914).
10. Cochran v. Pittsburg & Lake Erie R. R., 31 F. (2d) 769 (App. D. C.
1923); Central Railroad of N. J. v. Peluso, 286 Fed. 661 (C. C. A. 2d, 1923).
11. Pitcairn v. Perry, 122 F. (2d) 881 (C. C. A. 8th, 1941); Carpenter v.
Baltimore & 0. R. R., 109 F. (2d) 375 (C. C. A. 6th, 1940); Eker v. Pettibone,
110 F. (2d) 451 (C. C. A. 7th, 1940); Terminal R. R. Ass'n of St. Louis v. Staengel,
122 F. (2d) 271 (C. C. A. 8th, 1941); Lowery v. Hocking Valley Ry., 60 F.
(2d) 78 (C. C. A. 6th, 1932); Chesapeake & Co. Ry. v. Smith, 42 F. (2d) 111
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The preceding cases showing the development of the application of the rule
res ipsa loquitur to actions between employees and employers and the principal
case all arose under federal acts. The rule seems settled now in such cases that the
rule may be applied.' 2 The principal case is representative of the more recent
decisions in favor of workmen.
Many state courts independent of similar statutes have applied the rule in this
class of litigation. The Missouri courts have been rather liberal in allowing the ap-
plication of the rule to cases between employer and employees not controlled by
federal law. As early as 1892 the Supreme Court of Missouri approved a case' 3
decided on the basis of the rule where the plaintiff was an employee of the defend-
ant The injury there resulted from the automatic starting of the machine which
plaintiff was operating. Following this case is a long line of decisions allowing the
rule where the injury results from the automatic starting of machinery.' 4 These
cases were all decided without reference to federal law.
Aside from cases where the injury results from the automatic starting of ma-
chinery, the decisions by the Missouri courts are more hesitant in allowing the
application of res ipsa loquitur,15 the courts seemingly considering that the prece-
dents of the automatic starting are to be strictly limited to that type of situation.
However, the general rule as stated in these situations is broad enough to cover other
types of cases.16 Where the legislature has placed some extra duty on the employer,
the Missouri courts have considered the rule applicable.' 7 Under the influence of
the recent cases decided by state courts under federal law,'- the decisions in the
automatic starting cases, and the general tendency of legislation to give more and
more protection to the employee, making the business bear the loss, further exten-
sions may be anticipated in the application of the rule to other situations in this
field. The widespread application of workmen's compensation acts to injured em-
12. (1936) 21 ST. Louis L. REv. 166.
13. Blanton v. Dold, 109 Mo. 74, 18 S. W. 1149 (1892).
14. Gordon v. Muchling Packing Co., 328 Mo. 123, 131, 40 S. W. (2d) 693,
696 (1931) (sausage grinding machine. This case reviews the former holdings and
sets out the rule applicable to such cases); Kitchen v. Schlueter Mfg. Co., 323 Mo.
1179, 20 S. W. (2d) 676 (1929) (punch press); Nelson v. C. Heinz Stove Co.,
320 Mo. 655, 8 S. W. (2d) 918 (1928) (power press); Lowe v. Fox Laundry,
Cleaning & Dying Co., 274 S. W. 857 (Mo. App. 1925) (pressing machine); Taul
v. Askew Saddlery Co., 229 S. W. 420 (Mo. App. 1921) (power press); Ash v.
Woodward & Turnan Printing Co., 199 S. W. 994, 997 (Mo. 1917) (paper cutting
machine).
15. Removich v. Bambrick Bros. Const. Co., 264 Mo. 43, 173 S. W. 686 (1915);
Beebe v. Transit Co., 206 Mo. 441, 103 S. W. 1019 (1907), note (1908) 12 L. R. A.
(N.s.) 760; Fuchs v. City of St. Louis, 167 Mo. 620, 67 S. W. 610, 617 (1902).
Contra: Ferguson v. Fulton Iron Works, 220 Mo. App. 525, 259 S. W. 811, 814
(1924) (indicating the more modern approach to the problem).
16. Gordon v. Muehling Packing Co., 328 Mo. 123, 40 S. W. (2d) 693 (1931).
17. Propulonris v. Goebel Const. Co., 279 Mo. 358, 213 S. W. 792 (1919);
Burt v. Nichols, 264 Mo. 18, 173 S. W. 681 (1915), note, L. R. A. 1917E, 250.
18. Sibert v. Litchfield & M.-Ry., 159 S. W. (2d) 612 (Mo. 1942); Benner v.
Terminal R. R. Ass'n of St. Louis, 348 Mo. 928, 156 S. W. (2d) 657.
19441 RECENT CASES
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ployees has removed many situations which otherwise may have pressed the courts
on the immediate problem.
In applying the rule to cases between employee and employer, the further prob-
lem arose, which is considered in the principal case, as to how much control the
injured employee could have over the instrumentality that injures him and still
recover under this rule. The rule res ipsa loquitur is ordinarily applied only where
sole control and management of the injuring instrumentality is in the defendant. 10
By the very nature of the employment the employee in using the appliance tests
the concept of sole management of the defendant. But the courts have for the
most part been liberal in construing "sole control and management."20 It has been
made easier by federal statutes which make the employer liable for the actions of
fellow employees. This attitude reflects the social interest in giving proper protec-
tion to the employee in modem mass-production industry. "Because of the extreme
division of labor in modem industry, the servant may know nothing of the con-
struction of the machine with which he works, so that when an injury occurs, the
master or the person whom he has delegated to take charge of inspection and repair
of the machine, is the only one in a position to determine the cause of the injury." 21
The division of labor characteristic of modem industry not only reduces the
possibility of the workman's knowing the cause of the injury, but also greatly re-
duces his control over the machine he operates. For this reason, cases which at
first appear to be a relaxation of the traditional rule, on closer scrutiny are often
found to carry it out completely. Where22 an engineer is killed while in control
of the engine by its derailment which was caused by a defect of the pony track-
a part of the engine-the court said, "The decedent, as engineer, had control of
the speed of the engine, but he had no more control and was no more responsible
for the proper functioning of the pony track which caused the accident than was
the fireman, brakeman, or conductor."
But in determining the application of the rule res ipsa loquitur in employer-
employee cases the courts have usually rephrased the rule to state the limitations on
the control which the employee can have over the injuring instrumentality and still
recover. It is generally stated, where the plaintiff employee is injured in an accident
by some device or machine, the management, inspection and repair of which is
entrusted to other servants exclusively, that res ipsa loquitur applies.22 However, if
19. Terminal R. R. Ass'n of St. Louis v. Staengel, 122 F. (2d) 271 (C. C. A.
8th, 1941); Ridge v. Norfolk Southern Ry., 167 N. C. 510,83 S. E. 762 (1914),L. R.
A. 1917E, 215, 226; 35 AM. JUR., MASTER AND SERVANT § 498; 39 C. J., MASTER AND
SERVANT § 976; 18 R. C. L., MASTER AND SERVANT § 124 (Supp. 6, 1929).
20. (1933) 11 N. Y. U. L. Q. REV. 297 points out that the courts in other
res ipsa cases, besides employer-employee, are liberal in construction of "sole con-
trol and management."
21. (1925) 25 COL. L. REV. 109.
22. Eker v. Pettibon, 110 F. (2d) 451 (C. C. A. 7th, 1940).
23. Pitcain v. Perry, 122 F. (2d) 881, 885 (C. C. A. 8th, 1941); Benner v.
Terminal R. R. Ass'n of St. Louis, 348 Mo. 928, 938, 156 S. W. (2d) 657, 661 (1941);
Gordon v. Muchiing Packing Co., 328 Mo. 123, 140, 40 S. W. (2d) 693, 701 (1931).
[Vol. 9
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plaintiff is charged with the inspection and direction of the repairing of the machine
causing the injury, the rule will not apply.24 If the injured employee is supervising
an operation which causes his injury, as the re-railing of a freight car, he cannot
plead under res ipsa loquitur.25 In cases such as the principal one, where the in-
jury is caused by a defect in the road bed or rails,28 it is clear that a member of a
train crew had no control of the instrument causing the injury. Likewise the rule
has been held applicable where the injury resulted from defects in appliances not
under plaintiff's charge, such as couplers,27 brakes, 28 electric shock from telephone
set;29 where substances were thrown off by passing trains; 0 where an elevator"1 or
scaffold 2 fell; where a boiler exploded.33
Perhaps the time has come to change the entire approach to whether the rule
res ipsa loquitur is applicable to the employee-employer cases, to discard the older
decisions based upon an obsolete theory of the relation, and to apply the rule as in
other types of situations with special considerations in instances where the injured
employee must work with the thing causing the harm yet is not in complete con-
trol of it.
M. MARING
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION-CONFLICT OF LAWS-FULL FAITH AND CREDIT
Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Hunt,
Plaintiff, a resident of Louisiana, in that state entered into a contract of em-
ployment with defendant, a corporation licensed to do business in Louisiana and
Texas. He was sent by the defendant into the state of Texas, where, in the course
of his employment, he suffered an injury for-which he claimed compensation under
24. Lynch v. N. Y., N. H. & H; R. R., 200 N. E. 877 (Mass. 1936).
25. Dryden v. Western Pacific Ry., 1 Cal. App. (2d) 49, 36 P- (2d) 394
(1934).
26. Sibert v. Litchfield & M. Ry., 159 S. W. (2d) 612 (Mo. 1942); Terminal
R. R. Ass'n of St. Louis v. Staengel, 122 F. (2d) 271 (C. C. A, 8th, 1941); Williams
v. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry., 337 Mo. 667, 85 S. W. (2d) 624 (1935); Lowery
v. Hocking Valley Ry., 60 F. (2d) 78 (C. C. A. 6th, 1932).
27. Minneapolis & St. Louis Ry. v. Gotschall, 244 U. S. 66, 37 Sup. Ct. 598
(1917); Gable v. Central of Georgia Ry., 39 Ga. App. 350, 147 S. E. 135 (1929).
28. Chesapeake & 0. Ry. v. Smith, 42 F. (2d) 111 (C. C. A. 6th, 1930); Mc-
Grew v. Southern Ry., 206 N. C. 873, 175 S. E. 286 (1934).
29. Benner v. Terminal R. R. Ass'n of St. Louis, 348 Mo. 928, 156 S. W.
(2d) 657 (1941).
30. Noce v. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry., 337 Mo. 689, 85 S. W. (2d) 637
(1935); Howard v. Chicago & A. R. R., 179 Ill. App. 380 (1913); Pittsburgh, C., C.,
& St. L. Ry. v. Hoffman, 57 Ind. App. 431, 107 N. E. 315 (1914).
31. Artificial Ice & Cold Storage Co. v. Waltz, 86 Ind. App. 534, 156 N. E,
534 (1927).
32. Propulonris v. Goeble Const. Co., 279 Mo. 358, 213 S. W. 792 (1919);
Talge Mahogany Co. v. Hockett, 55 Ind. App. 303, 103 N. E. 815 (1914).
33. Harris v. Mangum, 183 N. C. 235, 111 S. E. 177 (1922).
1. 64 Sup. Ct. 208 (U. S. 1943).
1944] .RECENT CASES
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the Workmen's Compensation Act of that state. Defendant's insurer paid the
statutory benefits pending the award of the Texas commission. In the meantime
plaintiff returned to Louisiana and notified the insurer of his intention to claim the
benefits of the Louisiana law. He took no further steps to prosecute his claim
under the Texas act, disregarded the notice of hearing sent him by the commission
of that state and was not represented at the hearing, which resulted in an award
in his favor. The award became final and the insurer tendered him the amount
required, which plaintiff rejected. Under Texas law, the final' award of the com-
mission has the force of a judgment by a court of competent jurisdiction. Plaintiff
then brought the instant action against the defendant employer in the Louisiana
courts for benefits provided by the Louisiana act. Defendant pleaded the Texas
award and contended that it was res judicata of the rights! of the parties. Judg-
ment was entered for the plaintiff, with the provision that the amounts received
from.the insurer should be deducted from the benefits permitted under the Louisi-
afia law. The Louisiana court of appeals affirmed and the Louisiana Supreme Court
denied certiorari. The United States Supreme Court then granted its writ of
certiorari, directed to the court of appeals, and reversed the judgment, five justices
to four.
The decision was indeed about as close as it could have been, for one of the
majority, who felt that the case was governed by the recent decision in Williams
v. North Carolina,2 a decision to which he had vigorously dissented, stated that he
would have joined the dissenters had they favored overruling that precedent. In-
stead, they preferred to distinguish it.
The several very able opinions so completely state the conflicting theory and
examine the authorities that a commentator can add little to the argument. The
decision of the court, although opposed to the weight of previous authority on the
precise question,3 seems more nearly in harmony with fairly analagous precedent.
2. 317 U. S. 287, 63 Sup. Ct. 207 (1942), 143 A. L. R. 1273, 1294 (1943),
discussed by Evans, Jurisdiction to Divorce-A Study in Stare Decsi, (1943) 8)
Mo. LAw REv. 177.
3. RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 403; DODD, ADMINISTRATION OF
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION (1936) 819; SCHNEIDER, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION(3d ed. 1941) § 160; GOODRIcH, HANDBOOK ON CONFLICT OF LAws (2d ed. 1938)§ 97. Interstate Power Co. v. Industrial Commission, 203 Wis. 466, 234 N. W.
889 (1931); Salvation Army v. Industrial Commission, 219 Wis. 343, 263, N. W.
349 (1935); Constanti Migue's Case, 281 Mass. 373, 183 N. E. 847 (1933); Gil-
bert v. Des Lauri~rs Column Mould Co., 180 App. Div. 59, 167 N. Y. Supp. 274
(3d Dep't 1917); Anderson v. Jarrett Chambers Co., 210 App. Div. 543, 206 N. Y.
Supp. 458 (3d Dep't 1924); see Rousanville v. Central R. R., 87 N. J. L. 371,
94 At. 392 (1915). Guy McLaughlin's Case, 274 Mass. 217, 174 N. E. 338 (1931)
semble. Contra: Hughey v. Ware, 34 N. M. 29, 276 Pac. 27 (1929); De Gray
v. Miller Bros. Const. Co., 106 Vt. 259, 173 Atl. 556 (1934). Tidwell v. Chatta-
nooga Boiler and T. Co., 163 Tenn. 420, 43 S. W. (2d) 221 (1931) semble.
None of the Supreme Court decisions cited seem very directly in point, except
for the general principles which have evolved out of the construction of the "full
faith and credit" clause of the Constitution. Thus, Troxell v. Delaware, L. & W.
[Vol. 9
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It has never been supposed that a successful, any more than an unsuccessful, plaintiff
could relitigate in another state a civil claim on which final judgment had been
rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction of a sister state,4 in the hope of a
higher verdict.5 And the circumstance that the "internal" law of the second state
would have required a different judgment, and that the conflict of laws rule of the
second state would have required the application of its own "internal" law (as
distinguished from the situation at the trial in the first state, where the forum,
by its conflicts rule had applied its "internal" law) has not been thought to
create a separate claim or right which had not been adjudicated. Although the
United States Constitution has not, with rare exceptions,6 been held to dictate the
choice of law to be applied by the first forum to hear the controversy, it has
consistently been used to compel recognition of the conclusiveness of the judgment
when rendered. Neither the legitimate concern of the second state with the parties
and facts of the case, which would justify the imposition of its own internal law
if the case were being tried before its courts originally, nor a strong public policy
R. R., 227 U. S. 434, 33 Sup. Ct. 274 (1913), relied on by Justice Douglas, merely
held that a judgment for defendant in an action under state law brought by plain-
tiff in her individual capacity did not bar a subsequent action under the Federal
Employers' Liability Act brought by plaintiff in representative capacity, where,
because the injury was incurred in interstate commerce, the federal act was the
exclusive remedy and under it, the action could only be brought by the adminis-
tratrix. It seems clear the case does not recognize the possibility of two separate
claims, arising from the laws of two jurisdictions, for the single injury. Wabash
R. R. v. Hayes, 234 U. S. 86, 34 Sup. Ct. 729 (1914), thought by Chief Justice
Stone to have overruled parts of the Troxell opinion, simply held that a recovery was
possible under state law upon a pleading which stated a good cause of action
under state law, had not it averred that the injury took place in interstate
commerce, where the proof failed to establish the interstate character of the
activity. The opinion did state there was but one cause of action upon the true
facts, and whether or not recovery was under state law or the Federal Employers'
Liability Act depended upon the character of the commerce. In Chicago, R. I. &
P. Ry. v. Schendel, 270 U. S. 611, 46 Sup. Ct. 420 (1926), debated by all opinions,
the final state court decision that defendant was engaged in intrastate commerce,
so that the state act was applicable, was held res judicata of that issue to prevent
a subsequent suit under the federal act, which applied only to interstate commerce.
4. A distinction is made between judgments of sister states and of foreign
jurisdictions. In the latter case, the cause of action is said not to be merged in
the judgment, and a successful claimant may, if he chooses, sue again on the original
claim, to establish which the judgment may be used as evidence. Eastern Town-
ship Bank v. H. S. Beebe Co., 53 Vt. 177 (1880). Cf. Alaska Commercial Co. v.
Debney, 144 Fed. 1 (C. C. A. 9th,.1906).
5. STUMBERG, PRINCIPLES OF CONFLICT OF LAws (1937) 107, n. 3.
6. At one time it appeared that Workmen's Compensation might be one of
the exceptions. See Bradford Electric Light Co. v. Clapper, 286 U. S. 145, 52 Sup.
Ct. 571 (1932). More recently, there seems to have been considerable recession
from that position. Alaska Packers' Ass'n v. Industrial Comm'n, 294 U. S. 532,
55 Sup. Ct. 518 (1935) (permitting application of the Act of the place on contract
and employee's residence); Pacific Employers Insurance Co. v. Industrial Accident
Comm'n, 306 U. S. 493, 59 Sup. Ct. 629 (1939) (permitting application of the
Act of the place of injury). Attempts at reconciliation of the first opinion with the
latter two have not been wholly satisfactory.
RECENT CASES1944]
7
et al.: Recent Cases
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1944
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW
(whatever that may mean) against the conclusion reached by the court of the first
state, as evidenced by a marked difference in the internal laws of the two states,
will justify refusal to accord the first judgment its full effect as res judicata,7 al-
thyough the courts of the second state may possibly be permitted to deny affirmative
assistance in enforcing that judgment.8 If we suppose that A, a domiciliary of state
2 who in that state has no capacity to contract, enters into a contract with B in
state 1, by whose law he is competent, and a suit upon that contract is brought in
state 1 by the prevailing conflicts rule of this country the law of state 1 will be
applied 9 and judgment rendered for B. If this judgment were introduced in court in
state 2, a 'Supreme Court decision that it was not conclusive of the rights and
liabilities of the parties to that contract would certainly come as a great surprise
to the profession. Yet it cannot be denied that state 2 had a real concern for the
welfare of its domiciliaries and might have been justified as an original matter in
applying its own tests of capacity to the contract entered into in another state. In
fact, a considerable number of courts have done so.10
Perhaps the dissenting justices intended to carry their argument to its logical
conclusion and reconsider the whole body of precedent under the full faith and
credit provisions of the Constitution. Mr. Justice Douglas, in reply to the conten-
tion that Williams v. North. Carolina was controlling, observed that the question
was whether the two conflicting policies (of the two states) could somehow be
accommodated, and pointed out that while that might be impossible where the
issue was the marital status of two spouses (sic) domiciled in different states, it
was not beyond possibility in the instant situation to give each state opportunity to
enforce its Workmen's Compensation policy. Mr. Justice Black. argued that even
if the Texas decision were intended to foreclose rights under the Louisiana act, which
he did not believe to be the case, it should not be permitted to deny to Louisiana
the power to grant the larger measure of compensation which it felt its residents
needed, for injuries incurred in the course of employment entered into in Louisiana."1
7. The leading case is Fauntleroy v. Lum, 210 U. S. 230, 28 Sup. Ct. 641
(1907).
8. The exact boundary of this privilege has not been marked out. Cf. Anglo-
American Provision Co. v. Davis Provision Co., 191 U. S. 373, 24 Sup. Ct. 92 (1903)
with Kenney v. Supreme Lodge, 252 U. S. 411, 40 Sup. Ct. 371 (1920) 10 A. L. R.
716, 719 (1921).
9. 2 BEALE, CONFLICT OF LAws (1935) 1177. See notes (1922) 18 A. L. R.
1518; (1931) 71 A. L. R. 744.
10. This is particularly true as to the capacity of married women. In general,
see the authorities cited supra, note 9.
11. Mr. Justice Black was even more specific, in that he contended it was a
drastic innovation to read into the Constitution that "two recoveries shall never be
allowed by separate states- for losses from a single personal injury." It is submitted
that this has long been the accepted interpretation of the "full faith and credit"
clause except as applied to Workmen's Compensation. If, as was held in Kenney
v. Supreme Lodge, 252 U. S. 411, 40 Sup. Ct. 371 (1920), the state of Illinois
could not effectuate its statutory policy not to enforce a judgment of a sister state
rendered under the latter's wrongful death statute, it is hard to understand how
it could effectuate a policy of allowing a recovery for allegedly wrongful death
[Vol. 9
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Of course, that is just what is done whenever full faith and credit is given- a foreign
judgment rendered according to a domestic policy repugnant to the policy of the
later forum. And so far as the Texas award having been intended to dispose only
of rights accruing under the Texas act is concerned, it must be remembered that
no judgment is based upon or enforces foreign law.12 The only law which any court
can administer is the law of the same jurisdiction and the existence of a given for-
eign law is but a fact which may be of primary significance, as the conflicts law of
the jurisdiction may will.
To some extent, it is true, problems of Workmen's Compensation have been
regarded as sui generis. Because the acts usually provide their own exclusive mode
of administration, courts have rarely been confronted with the question of whether
they should enforce the remedies provided by the act of another state which had.
some connection with the injury or parties. Rather, the courts have had to decide
whether the act of their own state was or was not intended to cover the situation.'3
Many opinions have suggested that the matter was more than a controversy between
employer and employee and that the state was an interested party, concerned in pro-
viding benefits for persons who might otherwise be public charges. It could hardly
be denied that several states might provide relief benefits for the same person if
they chose. Can they do so at the expense of the same employer, singled out from
the other taxpayers by reason of employment of the injured person? As long as
the employer bears the cost, it is hard to see in what way the interest of the state
is greater than in more conventional forms of tort litigation.
0. B. E.
when a recovery had been denied in a court of competent jurisdiction, or a different
assessment of damages made.
12. This really goes to the essence of Mr. Justice Black's argument. He would
apparently agree that if the judgment were enforceable where rendered, it must be
enforceable everywhere as a determination of the law of the state in which it was
rendered. He would not make it conclusive of the law of the other states and of
the rights given under the latter laws. As he gives no reason for distinguishing
between statute and common law, under that reasoning a plaintiff might retry any
case in as many jurisdictions as he could serve the defendant, for as stated in the
text, no judgment is upon any other rights than those created by the law of the
forum. The doctrine of merger in judgment has never been so limited and what-
ever the literal meaning of the full faith and credit provisions, to so circumscribe
their effect would indeed diminish its integrating effect upon the forty-eight states.
13. For the Missouri decisions, see Bour, Recent Missouri Decisions and the
Restatement of Conflict of Laws (1938) 3 Mo. L. REv. 143. For a summary of
the treatment of other courts, see note (1939) 4 Mo. L. REv. 203. For a summary
of statutory provisions, see note (1944) 57 H.Av. L. REV. 242.
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